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Abstract The definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8 bis of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) stipulates
that a State act of aggression is a material element of the crime, suggesting
an intrinsic link between individual criminal responsibility and State
responsibility for aggression. This article argues that the Rome Statute
provides a legal basis for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
determine State responsibility for aggression when considering the material
elements of the crime of aggression, which has important practical and
conceptual implications for the law of international responsibility.
Although the content of State responsibility flows automatically from the
breach of the obligation, it is argued that a finding of aggression pursuant
to Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute may be considered as a form of
satisfaction for the purposes of Article 37 of the 2001 ILC Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001 ILC
Articles). Furthermore, the material element of the crime in Article 8 bis of
the Rome Statute requires the act of aggression by its character, gravity,
and scale to constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations, in line with the nomenclature used within the 2001 ILC Articles
regarding serious breaches of obligations arising from peremptory norms of
general international law (jus cogens). The article considers the important role
that the ICC may play in relation to serious breaches of the jus cogens
obligation to refrain from an act of aggression.
Keywords: public international law, aggression, crime of aggression, State
responsibility, individual criminal responsibility, International Criminal Court,
international dispute settlement, reparation, satisfaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
On 17 July 2018, two decades after the adoption of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), the International Criminal Court
* Lecturer in Law, University of Essex, meagan.wong@essex.ac.uk. I am grateful to Christiane
Ahlborn, Antonio Coco, Olufemi Elias, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Miles Jackson, Vladyslav
Lanovoy, Noam Lubell, Martins Paparinskis, Felipe Viveros-Montoya, and Katja Ziegler for
their comments on an earlier draft of this article; to the University of Bologna, the International
Law Research Cluster at the University of Leicester Law School, and the Grotius Dialogue at
Leiden University for the opportunity to present my work in progress; and finally, to the
journal’s anonymous peer reviewers for their comments.
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of British Institute of
International and Comparative Law. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in anymedium, provided the originalwork is properly cited.
[ICLQ vol 70, October 2021 pp 961–990] doi:10.1017/S0020589321000373
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589321000373
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.30.88.132, on 15 Nov 2021 at 13:11:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
(ICC) activated its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This crime was
defined in 2010 by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (ASP)
as including State conduct as a material element.1 Article 8 bis(1) of the
Rome Statute stipulates that, for the purposes of the Statute:
‘crime of aggression’means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by
a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
This definition interlinks the act of aggression and the crime of aggression in
formal terms and suggests a conceptual connection between individual
criminal responsibility for aggression and State responsibility. The ordinary
meaning of the language seems to suggest that the Court is now competent to
consider questions concerning State responsibility for aggression. This
proposition may seem contrarian: the ICC is a judicial institution dealing
with individual criminal responsibility,2 and State responsibility and
individual criminal responsibility are conceptually and technically distinct
legal regimes in international law.3 Alain Pellet, for example, thought it was
clear that ‘it is not the ICC’s function to judge sovereign States’.4
Nevertheless, if the crime of aggression is prosecuted before the Court, the
ICC will be required to consider State responsibility for an act of aggression.
This article argues that the Rome Statute does indeed provide a legal basis for
the Court to determine State responsibility for aggression, which has two
important practical and conceptual implications. First, the determination by
the Court of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis of the Rome
Statute may constitute a form of satisfaction,5 which is an extraordinary form
of reparation applicable in the institutional setting of the ICC. Further, penal
action against the individual or the adjudicative process itself may also be
1 The Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ASP)
adopted at the 13th plenary meeting on 11 June 2010 by consensus, Resolution RC/Res.6, which
inserts a definition of the crime of aggression after Article 8 in Annex I. Prior to this meeting,
Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute stipulated: ‘The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.’ Note that Article 5(2) was deleted in accordance with RC/Res.6,
Annex I of 11 June 2010 and is now referred to as ‘formerArticle 5(2)’ for the purposes of this paper.
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) Preamble, arts 1 and 25(1).
3 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ in
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001 (United Nations 2001) vol II(2) 26 (2001
ILC Articles); Rome Statute (n 2) art 25(4). See P-M Dupuy, ‘International Criminal
Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the State’ in A Cassese, P
Gaeta and JRWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) vol II, 1060–1; R O’Keefe, International Criminal
Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 79–81; see also T Ruys, ‘Criminalizing Aggression: How
the Future of the Law on the Use of Force Rests in the Hands of the ICC’ (2018) 29 EJIL 887, 890.
4 A Pellet, ‘Response to Koh and Buchwald’s Article: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza Tilt at
Windmills’ (2015) 109 AJIL 557, 562. 5 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 37.
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characterised as a form of satisfaction.6 Secondly, individual criminal
responsibility at the ICC is premised on the aggravated regime of State
responsibility arising from the act of aggression,7 as the State conduct
element in the definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8 bis reflects
the nomenclature found in the 2001 International Law Commission’s Articles
on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (2001 ILC Articles)
regarding a serious breach of an obligation arising from a peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens).8
This article is structured in four parts. First, the article draws upon State
conduct being a material element of the crime of aggression in the Rome
Statute to explain how individual criminal responsibility is predicated upon
State responsibility (Section II). Secondly, it will be argued that the Rome
Statute gives powers to the ICC to determine State responsibility for
aggression under Article 8 bis, and that the jurisdiction of the Court over the
crime of aggression fulfils the need of State consent. Consideration is also
given to the potential findings of internationally wrongful acts which the ICC
may make during the course of judicial proceedings concerning the crime of
aggression (Section III).
Thirdly, with regard to the content of international responsibility that flows
from the breach of the international obligation, it is submitted that satisfaction is
an appropriate form of reparation when addressing State responsibility for
aggression. Article 8 bis(1) requires that a threshold be met with regard to the
character, gravity and scale of the act of aggression, in line with the
nomenclature in the 2001 ILC Articles on a serious breach of an obligation
arising from a peremptory norm of international law.9 Hence, it is argued that
the Rome Statute provides for an institutionalised response to a serious breach
of a peremptory norm, with individual criminal responsibility operating as a
further element of State responsibility within the meaning of Article 41(3) of
the 2001 ILC Articles (Section IV).
Fourthly, the article examines how States entitled to make a claim in
accordance with Articles 42 and 48 of the 2001 ILC Articles can use the
structures of the ICC to invoke the responsibility of the aggressor State,
exploring the bilateral and multilateral aspects of implementation. An
additional multilateral dimension is provided by the role of the ICC and
6 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) (Reparations owed by the
Parties) Verbatim Record CR 2021/11 (28 April 2021 at 3 pm) 79, para 15(d) (Kakhozi on behalf of
the DRC).
7 See M Spinedi, ‘From One Codification to Another: Bilateralism and Multilateralism in the
Genesis of the Codificaton of the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility’ (2002) 13
EJIL 1099; E Wyler, ‘From “State Crime” to Responsibility for “Serious Breaches of Obligations
under Peremptory Norms of General International Law”’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1147, 1150; P Klein,
‘Responsibility for Serious Breaches of Obligations Deriving from Peremptory Norms of
International Law and United Nations Law’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1241, 1244; A Cassese, ‘On Some
Problematic Aspects of the Crime of Aggression’ (2007) 20 LJIL 841, 845–56.
8 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 40. 9 ibid arts 40 and 41.
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Security Council as organs of international organisations that can trigger the
initiation of an investigation where the crime of aggression, arising from an
act of aggression, may have occurred. A proprio motu investigation by the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) or a referral by the Security Council may
result in the international responsibility for aggression (both of the State and
individual) being invoked. The mere existence of these institutionalised
structures demonstrates the progressive development of the concept of further
consequences of a serious breach of a peremptory norm, even before their
application in practice.
While the crime of aggression at the ICC is not a new subject of enquiry,10
scholarly contributions have hitherto focused predominantly on issues relevant
to individual criminal responsibility,11 or conditions for the Court’s exercise of
jurisdiction.12 The link between State responsibility and individual criminal
responsibility for aggression, on which this article focuses,13 has received
limited attention.14 It is important not to understate the extent to which this
10 C Kreß and L von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’
(2010) 8 JICJ 1179; S Barriga and L Grover, ‘A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of
Aggression’ (2011) 105 AJIL 517; C McDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press 2013); S Sayapin, The
Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, Comparative
Analysis and Present State (Springer 2014); P Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of
Aggression (Routledge 2015); G Kemp, Individual Criminal Liability for the International Crime
of Aggression (2nd edn, Intersentia 2015).
11 KJ Heller, ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the Crime of
Aggression’ (2007) 18 EJIL 477; M Milanovic, ‘Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala’
(2012) 10 JICJ 165.
12 RS Clark, ‘Negotiations on the Rome Statute, 1995–98’ in C Kreß and S Barriga (eds), The
Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I; A Zimmermann,
‘Amending the Amendment Provisions of the Rome Statute: The Kampala Compromise on the
Crime of Aggression and the Law of Treaties’ (2012) 10 JICJ 209; S Barriga and N Blokker,
‘Entry into Force and Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction: Cross-Cutting Issues’ in C
Kreß and S Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press
2016) vol I; N Blokker and S Barriga, ‘Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction Based on Security
Council Referrals’ in C Kreß and S Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary
(Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I; S Barriga and N Blokker, ‘Conditions for the Exercise
of Jurisdiction Based on State Referrals and Proprio Motu Investigations’ in C Kreß and S
Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I.
13 ILC, ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ in Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 1996 (United Nations 1996) vol II(2) 43, art 16, Commentary, para
4; see also Dupuy (n 3).
14 For example, Van Schaack acknowledges the intrinsic link between State and individual
conduct for aggression but focuses on the issue of domestic prosecution, B Van Schaack, ‘Par in
Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’ (2012) 10 JICJ 133,
149; and J Trahan writes that Article 8 bis ‘makes clear that the crime cannot occur without the
required state act of aggression’ but does not expand on the State responsibility aspects, J
Trahan, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal Court’ in LN Sadat (ed),
Seeking Accountability for the Unlawful Use of Force (Cambridge University Press 2018) 315.
But note the brief discussion in D Akande and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Crime of Aggression in
the ICC and State Responsibility’ (2017) 58 HarvIntlLJ 33, 34–35D; in relation to State consent,
D Akande and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of
Aggression’ (2018) 29 EJIL 939, 959.
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claim goes against mainstream thinking that the ICC may only consider
questions of individual criminal responsibility for crimes within its
jurisdiction.15 By challenging the current consensus that the ICC is not a
competent forum to consider State responsibility, this article sheds light on a
significant development in international law: States Parties to the Rome
Statute have conferred powers to the Court to address State conduct in
relation to aggression.
Thus, the crime of aggression at the ICC extends beyond international
criminal law. This has implications for States Parties to the Rome Statute
(and non-States Parties) whose interests are engaged during judicial
proceedings at the ICC concerning the crime of aggression, since the law of
State responsibility is engaged when the crime is prosecuted. Further, the
ICC can be seen as providing an institutionalised response to a serious breach
of a peremptory norm, in line with the progressive development of the rules of
State responsibility.16
II. UNDERSTANDING THE STATE CONDUCT ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
The definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute is peculiar in that it
provides for an internationally wrongful act of a State to be an element of the
crime. The first paragraph of Article 8 bis provides:
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of
a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
An ‘act of aggression’ is further defined in Article 8 bis(2) as ‘the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations’. Two points follow from this. First, an act of
aggression for the purposes of Article 8 bis is defined by reference to inter-
State conduct. Secondly, an act of aggression in paragraph 2 must satisfy the
threshold in paragraph 1 to qualify as a crime of aggression. Consequently, not
every act of aggression will amount to a crime of aggression for the purposes of
Article 8 bis(1). The third point is related to and follows from the prohibition of
aggression being a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)17
15 Situation in the State of Palestine (ProsecutionResponse to theObservations of Amici Curiae,
Legal Representatives of Victims, and States) ICC-01/18 (30 April 2020) para 33; A Reisinger
Coracini and P Wrange, ‘The Specificity of the Crime of Aggression’ in C Kreß and S Barriga
(eds), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I, 316;
Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Crime of Aggression in the ICC and State Responsibility’
(n 14) 33. 16 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 41, Commentary 3.
17 ibid art 40, Commentary 4; ILC, ‘Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus
Cogens)’ (29 May 2019) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.936, Annex (ILC Draft Conclusions on Peremptory
Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) on first reading) Draft Conclusion 23; D Tladi,
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that has the character of an erga omnes obligation.18 Thus, the nature of the
prohibition of aggression means that its breach involves multilateral
dimensions of State responsibility, as discussed in Sections IV and V.19
The State conduct element of the crime is the act of aggression which, by its
character, gravity and scale, constitutes amanifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations (UN Charter).20 The Court will therefore have to determine the
existence of such an act of aggression before examining the conduct of the
individual.21 This is its key difference from all other crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC:22 individual criminal responsibility for other crimes is
not predicated on a finding of internationally wrongful State conduct.
The definition of genocide does not make any reference to State
involvement.23 With regard to the definition of crimes against humanity, the
ICC may have to evaluate State policy24 because an ‘“attack directed against
any civilian population”, means a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts… against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’.25
However, such a finding can be made on the basis of ‘organizational’ policy,
as an alternative to ‘State’ policy, a notable difference from the crime of
aggression where internationally wrongful State conduct is an element of the
crime. Further, organisational policy extends beyond ‘State-like
organizations’,26 consequently ‘organizations not linked to a State may, for
‘Fourth Report on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens)’ (2019) UN Doc
A/CN.4/727, paras 59–60, 62–8. See also International Law Association, ‘Final Report on
Aggression and the Use of Force’ (2018) (ILA Report on aggression and the use of force) 27.
18 The ICJ named the outlawing of aggression as an example of an obligation erga omnes in the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [1970] ICJ
Rep 3, para 34; 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 48, Commentary 10.
19 Wyler (n 7) 1155–7. See also Spinedi (n 7); L-A Sicilianos, ‘The Classification of Obligations
and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility’ (2002) 13 EJIL
1127.
20 C Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ in C Kreß and S Barriga (eds), The Crime of
Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I.
21 The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (IMT) first determined whether Germany
had committed wars of aggression prior to assessing the criminal responsibility of the defendants; as
reproduced in ‘Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals, Nuremberg, 30 September and 1 October 1946 (Reproduced)’ (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 186–
221; see also C Greenwood, ‘What the ICC Can Learn from the Jurisprudence of Other Tribunals’
(2017) 58 Harvard International Law Online Journal 71, 71–2.
22 Rome Statute (n 2) art 5(1).
23 ibid art 6; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia andMontenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep
43, paras 297, 413–5.
24 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity’ in ‘Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session’ (2019) UN Doc A/74/
10, 11, para 44 (Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity) art 2(1),
Commentaries 28–33. 25 Rome Statute (n 2) art 7(1).
26 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya) ICC-01/09-19-Corr
(31March 2010) para 90; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga andMathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on
the confirmation of charges) ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008) para 394; Prosecutor v William
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the purposes of the Statute, elaborate and carry out a policy to commit an attack
against a civilian population’.27 The Court may thus prosecute crimes against
humanity in the absence of a State policy,28 or committed by non-State actors.29
As regards war crimes, Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates ‘the Court
shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’.
The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo held that ‘the statutory requirement of either large-scale commission
or part of a policy is not absolute but qualified by the expression “in
particular”’.30 The Trial Chamber also explained in Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo that ‘the term “particular” makes it clear that the existence of
a plan, policy or large-scale commission is not a prerequisite for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over war crimes but rather serves as a practical guideline
for the Court’.31 Thus, the requirement in Article 8(1), as ‘part of a plan or
policy’, is not essential for war crimes.
Article 8 of the Rome Statute refers to ‘[g]rave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949’;32 ‘[o]ther serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established
framework of international law’;33 and, in the case of a non-international
armed conflict, ‘serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949’.34 However, this definition refers to
obligations arising from treaties and custom binding on individuals, not
States. The Court, pursuant to Article 8, looks at the conduct of individuals
who have acted in breach of an obligation to refrain from violations of
international humanitarian law (treaties and custom) that are criminalised,
and it does not assess the conduct of a State. Thus, if a State agent commits
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on the confirmation of
charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) ICC-01/09-01/11 (23 January
2012) para 185; Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (Corrigendum to the Decision
pursuant to Article 15 of the 1998 Rome Statute on the authorisation of an investigation into the
situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire) ICC-02/11 (15 November 2011) paras 45–6.
27 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (n 26) para 92.
28 Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (n 24) art 3(1),
para 5; see also art 2(2)(a), Commentaries 32–3.
29 Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (Decision on the confirmation of charges) ICC-01/04-
01/10 (16 December 2011) para 2; Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Decision on the Prosecutor’s
application under Article 58) ICC-01/04-02/06 (13 July 2012) para 22. Draft Articles on
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (n 24) art 2(1), Commentary 33. cf art
8 bis(1) Rome Statute, which requires that the perpetrator has to be a person ‘in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State’.
30 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal
against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’) ICC-01/04 (13 July 2006) para 70.
31 Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009) para 211.
32 Rome Statute (n 2) art 8(2)(a). 33 ibid art 8(2)(b). 34 ibid art 8(2)(c).
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war crimes, the Court can only attribute conduct to the individual—and not the
State. This is different from the crime of aggression, where a determination of an
internationally wrongful act must be made pursuant to Article 8 bis of the Rome
Statute.
It might be wondered whether such inquiries really are so different from a
determination by the Court of an act of aggression in proceedings on the
crime of aggression.35 In the properly legal sense, the answer is ‘yes’. In
determining whether there is a ‘State policy’ or ‘a plan or policy’ for crimes
against humanity and war crimes respectively, whilst the Court may refer to
factual findings which are a part of the context, this does not convert them
into legal or material elements of the crime. Factual findings concerning a
State’s plan or policy in relation to crimes against humanity and war crimes
may have implications for State responsibility, but they are not legal
determinations by the Court concerning the commission of an internationally
wrongful act. More importantly, holding an individual criminally responsible
for crimes against humanity or war crimes does not require a formal legal
finding of State responsibility. The crime of aggression, on the other hand,
requires the Court to make an assessment of State conduct drawing upon the
law on the use of force.36 Individual criminal responsibility for the crime of
aggression is thus predicated upon State responsibility for aggression. It may
seem contrarian to suggest that the ICC determines State responsibility for
aggression. But this reflects the amended Rome Statute, the legal order of the
ICC, and the nomenclature in the 2001 ILC Articles, as will be argued in the
next section.
III. THE ICC AND THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF AGGRESSION
When prosecuting the crime of aggression, the ICC will have to assess
conduct of a State pursuant to Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. This
section will first examine the competence of the Court to determine State
responsibility and its powers to do so under the Rome Statute. Next, the
jurisdictional regime of the ICC over the crime of aggression will be
examined to consider whether State consent to the exercise of jurisdiction
is upheld during proceedings. The section concludes by examining Article
8 bis of the Rome Statute with respect to findings by the Court of
internationally wrongful acts.
35 C Stahn, ‘The “End”, the “Beginning of the End” or the “End of the Beginning”? Introducing
Debates and Voices on the Definition of “Aggression”’ (2010) 23 LJIL 875, 879.
36 MEO’Connell andMNiyazmatov, ‘What Is Aggression? Comparing the Jus Ad Bellum and
the ICC Statute’ (2012) 10 JICJ 189; Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ (n 20); D Akande and A
Tzanakopoulos, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Concept of Aggression’ in C Kreß and S
Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I,
214–15; Stahn (n 35) 879.
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A. The Competence of the ICC to Determine the Responsibility of a State for
Internationally Wrongful Acts
The ICC is an international criminal court which exercises jurisdiction over
persons for crimes within Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute.37 Is it also
competent to determine State responsibility for aggression? Reisinger
Coracini and Wrange suggest, inter alia, that the Court ‘has no mandate to
pronounce on the responsibility of a State’.38 This section will challenge that
view, by reference to the requirements of Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute.
The question of whether the ICC has competence to determine State
responsibility regarding aggression has to be answered by reference to the
Rome Statute. The starting point is that the ICC is an international
organisation. As such, its competence is derived from the powers attributed
to it by its Member States,39 found in the Rome Statute.40 Article 1 of the
Rome Statute, which establishes the Court, provides inter alia that ‘the
jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions
of this Statute’. Article 5 stipulates that the Court has jurisdiction with
respect to the crime of aggression,41 and Article 8 bis sets out the jurisdiction
ratione materiae of the crime.
Pursuant to Article 8 bis, the ICC needs tomake a determination that there has
been an act of aggression prior to determining individual criminal
responsibility. Some have labelled the determination of an act of aggression
in this context as a ‘mere preliminary question’42 or an ‘incidental’ finding of
State responsibility in the context of determining individual criminal
responsibility.43 As discussed in Section II, such a reading is hard to square
with the ordinary meaning of Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute, which
strongly suggests that the ICC cannot determine the criminal responsibility of
an individual without first establishing that an act of aggression has occurred.
The determination of the internationally wrongful act is a necessary condition
for determining the criminal responsibility of the defendant and thus cannot be a
‘preliminary’ or ‘incidental’ matter during the proceedings. Further, the
37 Rome Statute (n 2) art 1.
38 Reisinger Coracini andWrange (n 15) 316; see also Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Crime
of Aggression in the ICC and State Responsibility’ (n 14) 33–4.
39 F Martines, ‘Legal Status and Powers of the Court’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta and JRWD Jones
(eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press 2002) vol I,
215; A Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta and JRWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) vol II, 1053–5; G
Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy of Sources of Law before the ICC’ in C Stahn (ed), The Law and
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press 2015) 411; see also HG
Schermers and NM Blokker, International Institutional Law (6th edn, Brill Nijhoff 2018) 165–8.
40 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion)
[1996] ICJ Rep 66, para 25; see also Schermers and Blokker (n 39) 756–7; D Sarooshi,
International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford University Press
2005) 18. 41 Rome Statute (n 2) art 5(d). 42 Reisinger Coracini and Wrange (n 15) 316.
43 Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Crime of Aggression in the ICC and State Responsibility’
(n 14) 34–5.
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determination of an act of aggression is not an ancillary or incidental matter in
relation to jurisdiction but is, rather, part of the very subject matter on which the
Court’s jurisdiction is based,44 and thus falls within the Court’s competence
pursuant to Articles 5 and 8 bis of the Rome Statute. As an international
judicial institution, the ICC has the power to decide its own jurisdiction,
commonly referred to as Kompetenz-Kompetenz.45 Article 19(1) of the Rome
Statute stipulates that ‘[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in
any case brought before it’,46 which ‘denotes competence to deal with a
criminal cause or matter under the Statute’.47 Therefore the Court, if it is
satisfied that it has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, also has the
competence to determine an act of aggression, as this falls within the very
subject matter of Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute.48
From an international institutional law standpoint, former Article 5(2) of the
Rome Statute provided the ASP with the mandate to define the crime of
aggression as it deemed fit.49 The ASP, by adopting the amendments to the
Rome Statute in Kampala, conferred powers upon the Court to make a legal
determination of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis.50 Identical
Articles 15 bis(9) and 15 ter(4) confirm the competence of the ICC to do so:
‘a determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall
be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this Statute’.51
44 cf Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom), PCA Case No
2011-03, Final Award (18 March 2015) paras 220–1.
45 For a recent authoritative restatement of the proposition, with extensive reference to judicial
practice of various courts and tribunals, see Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the
Republic of Slovenia, PCA Case No 2012-04, Partial Award (30 June 2016) para 157 (‘in the
absence of agreement to the contrary, an arbitral or judicial tribunal has, under general
international law, jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction’) and further authorities at paras
148–56.
46 Situation in Uganda (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application that the Pre-Trial Chamber
Disregard as irrelevant the Submission Filed by the Registry on 5 December 2005) ICC-02/04-
01/05 (9 March 2006) paras 22–3; Prosecutor v Kony et al (Decision of Admissibility of the
Case under Article 19(1) of the statute) ICC-02/04-01/05-377 (10 March 2009) para 45;
Prosecutor v Bemba (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 June
2009) para 23.
47 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Jurisdiction on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on
the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3
October 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06 OA4 (14 December 2006) para 24.
48 See Situation in the State of Palestine (Prosecution Response to the Observations of Amici
Curiae, Legal Representatives of Victims, and States) (n 15) para 33.
49 It should be particularly noted that the only caveat given to the ASP is that the provision on the
crime of aggression shall be consistent with the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) pursuant to
former art 5(2) of the Rome Statute (n 1); see also N Blokker, ‘The Crime of Aggression and the
United Nations Security Council’ (2007) 20 LJIL 867.
50 But see Akande and Tzanakopoulos who submit ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the ICC extends only to
the determination of the criminal responsibility of individuals,’ Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘The
Crime of Aggression in the ICC and State Responsibility’ (n 14) 33.
51 Barriga and Blokker, ‘Entry into Force and Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction: Cross-
Cutting Issues’ (n 12) 638–40. For a criticism of arts 15 bis(9) and 15 ter(4), see Pellet (n 4) 563.
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However, these powers are also limited by the nature of their conferral.
Schermers and Blokker note that ‘international organizations are only
competent to act as far as the powers attributed to them permit, and … they
may not use these powers for purposes other than those for which the powers
have been given’.52 Article 8 bis expressly confers powers to the ICC to
determine an act of aggression; the Court can therefore only examine State
conduct in accordance with this provision of the Rome Statute.53 Thus, States
Parties have not provided the ICC with a general competence to determine State
responsibility but have done so only in relation to the responsibility that arises
from a finding of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis.
It might be objected that Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute provides that ‘[n]o
provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect
the responsibility of States under international law’. Does Article 25(4) preclude
the ICC from determining State responsibility? The starting point, in accordance
with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
(VCLT), is the ordinary meaning of ‘affect’, which suggests that none of the
provisions relating to individual criminal responsibility can have a material
effect on State responsibility.54 Individual criminal responsibility, according
to O’Keefe, is ‘a function of the violation by an individual of an international
legal obligation binding on him or her’.55 This is separate and distinct from the
responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act, which arises when a
State has acted in breach of its international obligations.56 State responsibility
and individual criminal responsibility are distinct forms of international
responsibility arising from the breach of conceptually separate and distinct
rules under international law. Accordingly, a finding of State responsibility
does not relieve an individual of criminal responsibility, and likewise, a
finding of individual criminal responsibility does not absolve the State from
international responsibility. Under international law, State responsibility is
without prejudice to individual criminal responsibility.57 This ‘duality of
responsibility’ was acknowledged as a ‘constant feature of international law’
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Application of the
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide case
with particular reference to Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute.58
The better reading of Article 25(4) is that it reflects the ‘duality of
responsibility’, in the sense that a finding by the ICC of individual criminal
52 Schermers and Blokker (n 39) 168; see also Commentary to Article 4, W Schabas, The
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd edn, Oxford University
Press 2016) 106. 53 Schermers and Blokker (n 39) 758–60; Sarooshi (n 40) 18–19.
54 Oxford English Dictionary: the meaning of ‘affect’: ‘to have a material effect on; to make a
material impression on; to influence, move, touch’ <www.oed.com>. 55 O’Keefe (n 3) 79.
56 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 58; see also O’Keefe, ibid 79–80; D Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 3
JICJ 618, 636; Dupuy (n 3). 57 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 58, Commentary 3.
58 BosnianGenocide case (n 23) para 173; see alsoDraft Articles on Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes Against Humanity (n 24) art 3(1), Commentary 5.
Aggression and State Responsibility at the ICC 971
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589321000373
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.30.88.132, on 15 Nov 2021 at 13:11:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
responsibility does not affect the international responsibility of a State: the State
can still be internationally responsible if it has engaged in internationally
wrongful conduct. Applying this general proposition to the crime of
aggression at the ICC, a finding of individual criminal responsibility for the
crime of aggression does not affect the international responsibility of the
aggressor State. The aggressor State is still responsible under international
law for the act of aggression even if a State official has been found criminally
responsible. There is nothing in the text of Article 25(4) which precludes the
Court from making a determination of State responsibility for aggression. In
short, the competence of the ICC to make a determination of an act of
aggression stems from Articles 5 and 8 bis of the Rome Statute, powers
expressly attributed to it by the States Parties to the Rome Statute.
B. The Jurisdiction of the ICC over the Crime of Aggression and State Consent
Although the prosecution of an individual for the crime of aggression entails the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over a natural person,59 Article 8 bis(1) of the
Rome Statute makes State conduct an element of the crime, that is, a legal
finding that the alleged aggressor State has committed an act of aggression
pursuant to Article 8 bis(2), which satisfies the threshold element in Article 8
bis(1). As a result, the prosecution of an individual for the crime of
aggression necessarily entails determination of State conduct. This raises a
question of consent of the alleged aggressor State to the exercise of such
jurisdiction.60 Is there a nod towards the indispensable third party
principle?61 The not always consistent judicial practice on the topic has been
conceptualised as reflecting either a ‘jurisdictional principle that flows from
consent and is aimed at protecting actors that are capable in principle to
appear before the inter-State adjudicator, or a principle of admissibility that
flows from concerns about due process of actors of various kinds, absent
from various proceedings’,62 with the implication that ‘both versions have a
role to play, depending on the character of the institution, its own conception
of judicial function, and the type of legal issue presented’.63
An argument can be made that this principle is not applicable to the ICC since
it is not an inter-State dispute settlement forum, and that States are not parties to
the proceedings.64 However, an unusual tension arises because the Court has to
59 Rome Statute (n 2) art 25(1).
60 Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, UK and US) [1954] ICJ Rep 19,
33;Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters (Djibouti v France) [2008] ICJ Rep
177, paras 60–2. See also D Akande, ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role
of the Security Council’ (2010) Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict Working Paper
15–17.
61 M Paparinskis, ‘Revisiting the Indispensable Third Party Principle’ (2020) 1 Rivista di diritto
internaziole 49. 62 ibid 53. 63 ibid.
64 The Pre-Trial Chamber has taken the view that theMonetary Gold principle does not apply to
the ICC in Situation in the State of Palestine (Decision on the Prosecution request pursuant to article
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consider the legality of State conduct when considering the crime of aggression
pursuant to Article 8 bis. Leaving aside the question of the general applicability
of the indispensable third party principle at the ICC in relation to future
proceedings on the crime of aggression, the key question is whether the
alleged aggressor State must consent to the Court’s jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression if it is not a party to the proceedings. This is because
‘international judicial jurisdiction is based on and derives from the consent of
States’ and such consent could carry the legal significance of a waiver of the
indispensable third party objection.65
Indeed, the question of the consent of the aggressor State was discussed by
the States Parties during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the
amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression66 and the
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction ultimately adopted by the ASP67
reflect the requirement of the consent of the alleged aggressor State to
proceedings against an individual for the crime of aggression.
There are two jurisdictional regimes over the crime of aggression that may be
‘triggered’, depending on the circumstances in which the situation is referred to
the Court. The first, under Article 15 bis, is triggered by State referrals or
proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor.68 The second, pursuant to
Article 15 ter, is triggered by Security Council referrals. Although these
trigger mechanisms are procedural in nature, the scope of the jurisdiction that
the Court may exercise over the crime of aggression is based on the manner in
which it is triggered.69 Hence, two separate jurisdictions over the crime of
aggression exist, depending on whether jurisdiction was triggered by a State
referral or proprio motu investigations,70 or by a Security Council referral.71
One of the key differences is that for State referrals and proprio motu
investigations, Article 15 bis(5) stipulates:
In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals
or on its territory.72
Thus, in the absence of a Security Council referral, the ICC may only exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if both nationality and territorial
19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine) ICC-01/18 (5 February 2021)
para 59, fn 228.
65 H Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989: Part
Nine’ (1998) 69 BYBIL 1, 4. On waiver, see J Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 668.
66 As noted by the President of the Review Conference, Christian Wenaweser, one of the big
questions leading up to the negotiations was ‘whether some form of expressed consent by the
alleged aggressor State should be required or not’, C Wenaweser, ‘Reaching the Kampala
Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s Perspective’ (2010) 23 LJIL 883, 884.
67 See (n 1) above. 68 Rome Statute (n 2) arts 13(a) and (c); art 15 bis(1).
69 See O’Keefe (n 3) 539. 70 Rome Statute (n 2) art 15 bis. 71 ibid art 15 ter.
72 ibid 15 bis(5).
Aggression and State Responsibility at the ICC 973
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589321000373
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.30.88.132, on 15 Nov 2021 at 13:11:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
principles of jurisdiction are met.73 In other words, the ICC can only investigate
an individual who is a national of a State Party for the crime of aggression
arising from an act of aggression committed on the territory of another State
Party. Nationals from non-States Parties and aggression committed on their
territory are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of
aggression on the basis of State referrals and proprio motu investigations.
Indeed, this differs from the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to the other
crimes in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, over which, pursuant to Article 12(2)
(b), the Court may exercise jurisdiction so long as the alleged crime was
committed on the territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party.
Accordingly, if either the nationality or territorial jurisdictional principle is
fulfilled74 the Court may exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes.
The underlying rationale for the sui generis regime over the crime of
aggression is the need for consent of the alleged aggressor State whose
conduct will be considered in accordance with Article 8 bis.75 The alleged
aggressor State must be a party to the Rome Statute, signifying its consent to
the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(1). As Security Council
referrals are made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the consent of
member States can be found in Article 25 of the UN Charter by which they
‘agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter’.76 Through this provision in the UN
Charter, all States, including those not Parties to the Rome Statute, consent to
the Security Council referring its nationals or a crime allegedly committed on its
territory to the ICC.77 Accordingly, pursuant to Article 15 ter, the ICC can
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression arising from an act of
aggression committed by any State, including non-States Parties.78
Importantly, this means that the Court may only investigate and prosecute a
national from a non-State Party and determine whether an act of aggression
has been committed by a non-State Party if there has been a Security Council
referral.
73 Japan, in particular, has been critical. Statement by Japan, in ‘Statements by States Parties in
explanation of position before the adoption of resolution RC/Res.6, on the crime of aggression’
(2010) Review Conference official records, ICC Doc RC/11, Annex VII.
74 H-P Kaul, ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta and JRWD
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford
University Press 2002) vol II, 607–9; see also Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (n 56) 618–19.
75 For a background to the negotiation history of the Kampala Amendments in relation to State
consent, seeWenaweser (n 66) 884–5; Kreß and von Holtzendorff (n 10) 1212–16; N Blokker and C
Kreß, ‘AConsensus Agreement on the Crime of Aggression: Impressions fromKampala’ (2010) 23
LJIL 889, 893; Barriga and Grover (n 10) 523–6. 76 UN Charter art 25.
77 See D Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and Its Impact on
Al Bashir’s Immunities’ (2009) 7 JICJ 333, 343.
78 Understanding 2 of the Kampala Amendments; see also Blokker and Barriga, ‘Conditions for
the Exercise of Jurisdiction Based on Security Council Referrals’ (n 12) 648.
974 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589321000373
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.30.88.132, on 15 Nov 2021 at 13:11:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use
In the absence of a Security Council referral, the ICC is precluded by Article
15 bis(5) from exercising its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when
allegedly committed by a national of, or on the territory of, a non-State Party.
There is, however, another layer of debate concerning the consent of the alleged
aggressor State and the jurisdiction of the ICC in the event of State referrals and
proprio motu investigations. This concerns whether the alleged aggressor State
(Party) must ratify or accept the amendments on the crime of aggression—or if it
is sufficient for the State Party which alleges that there has been an act of
aggression to have done so. This goes to the manner in which States Parties
express consent, with broadly two positions: either consent is expressed by
way of the ratification or acceptance of the amendments to the Rome Statute
on the crime of aggression,79 or it is implied by tacit consent,80 subject to the
opt-out clause in Article 15 bis(4).81 The former suggests that consent is
expressed by way of acceptance or ratification of the amendments to the
Rome Statute, while the latter suggests that States Parties are deemed to have
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crimes in Article 5 by being
parties to the Rome Statute unless they opt out pursuant to Article 15 bis(4).
In 2017, the ASP adopted by consensus a Resolution for the Activation of the
jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression (Activation Decision),82
confirming that:
in the case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a
national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted
these amendments.83
The legal effect of the Activation Decision as an authentic means of
interpretation of the Rome Statute is not entirely clear.84 A question arises
whether, under Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT, the Activation Decision is a
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
Rome Statute.85 It is for the interpreter, ie the Court, to give appropriate
79 For example, Zimmermann, ‘Amending the Amendment Provisions of the Rome Statute: The
Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression and the Law of Treaties’ (n 12) 219–20; Akande
and Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’ (n 14) 949–
53. 80 Rome Statute (n 2) art 12(1).
81 Kreß and vonHoltzendorff (n 10) 1212–16; Blokker and Barriga, ‘Conditions for the Exercise
of JurisdictionBased on Security Council Referrals’ (n 12) 664–8. See alsoMFitzmaurice, ‘Consent
to Be Bound –Anything New under the Sun?’ (2005) 74 NordJIntlL 483, 488–90.
82 Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5, ‘Activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of
aggression’ (Adopted at the 13th plenary meeting of the ASP to the Rome Statute, on 14 December
2017). 83 ibid para 2.
84 See Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of
Aggression’ (n 14) 943–9; C Kreß, ‘On the Activation of ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of
Aggression’ (2018) 16 JICJ 1, 9–13; A Zimmermann, ‘A Victory for International Rule of Law?
Or: All’s Well That Ends Well?: The 2017 ASP Decision to Amend the Kampala Amendment on
the Crime of Aggression’ (2018) 16 JICJ 19.
85 Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’
(n 14) 946–8.
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weight to the Activation Decision when interpreting the Rome Statute.86 That
said, perhaps the better view is that the Activation Decision is a Rule of the
Organization made by the ASP and, as such, prevails over the VCLT87 and is
legally binding on organs of the ICC.88 Thus, the jurisdictional regime of the
crime of aggression in the event of State referrals and proprio motu
investigations can only be exercised upon ratification or acceptance by both
the alleged aggressor and the alleged victim States Parties.
The counterargument is that the Court may disregard the Activation
Decision, and exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression on the basis
that the alleged aggressor State Party is deemed to have consented to the
Court’s jurisdiction provided it has not opted out pursuant to Article 15 bis
(4). Accordingly, it would be sufficient to establish the Court’s jurisdiction
over this crime if the alleged victim State Party had ratified the amendments
to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression.
The details of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the
absence of a Security Council referral is outside the scope of this article.89 It
suffices to note that in the absence of a Security Council referral, regardless
of the interpretation ultimately to be applied by the ICC, the alleged
aggressor State (Party) will have consented to the Court’s exercise of
jurisdiction either by ratification of the amendments to the Rome Statute on
the crime of aggression, or by tacit consent (by not opting out), respectively.
In the event of a Security Council referral, the alleged aggressor State is
deemed to have consented as a consequence of Article 25 of the UN Charter.
As a result, the principle of State consent is respected in the jurisdictional
regime of the ICC over the crime of aggression.90 Accordingly, the
indispensable third party principle, even if applicable, is addressed by the
86 ILC, ‘Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to
the Interpretation of Treaties’ (2018) UNDoc A/73/10, 12, para 51 (2018 ILC Draft Conclusions on
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice) Draft Conclusion 11(3), Commentary 38.
87 MSWong, ‘The Activation of the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction over the Crime
of Aggression: International Institutional Law and Dispute Settlement Perspectives’ (2020) 22
International Community Law Review 197; 2018 ILC Draft Conclusions on Subsequent
Agreement and Subsequent Practice (n 86) Draft Conclusion 12(4); Draft Articles on Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (n 24) Draft Conclusion 12, Commentary 40.
88 Art 34 of the Rome Statute stipulates that Organs of the ICC are: (a) The Presidency; (b) An
Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division; (c) The Office of the Prosecutor; (d) The
Registry.
89 Akande and Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’
(n 14); Kreß, ‘On the Activation of ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’ (n 84);
Zimmermann, ‘A Victory for International Rule of Law? Or: All’s Well That Ends Well?: The
2017 ASP Decision to Amend the Kampala Amendment on the Crime of Aggression’ (n 84). See
also Zimmermann, ‘Amending the Amendment Provisions of the Rome Statute: The Kampala
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression and the Law of Treaties’ (n 12); Barriga and Blokker,
‘Entry into Force and Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction: Cross-Cutting Issues’ (n 12);
Barriga and Blokker, ‘Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction Based on State Referrals and
Proprio Motu Investigations’ (n 12).
90 C Kreß and L von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’
(2010) 8 JICJ 1179, 1212–16.
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consent91 of the alleged aggressor State to the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC
over an individual for a crime of aggression arising from aggression it has
allegedly committed.92
C. Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute and the 2001 ILC Articles
According to the 2001 ILC Articles, and reflecting customary international law,
‘every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State’.93 Elements of an internationally wrongful act of
a State pursuant to Article 2 of the 2001 ILC Articles comprise conduct
consisting of an action or omission that (a) is attributable to the State under
international law and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of
the State.94 A finding of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis of the
Rome Statute would amount to a judicial determination of conduct
attributable to the aggressor State that constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of that State. A finding of an act of aggression by the ICC under
Article 8 bis would be a legal determination of State conduct and thus a
finding of an internationally wrongful act of aggression fulfils both necessary
and sufficient criteria for establishing State responsibility.
As discussed in Section II, even if the threshold for the State conduct element
set out in Article 8 bis(1) is not met,95 there will still have been a finding of an act
of aggression under Article 8 bis(2).96 Similarly, if the ICC finds that the
wrongdoing State has committed a violation of the prohibition of the use of
force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter or customary international law,97
rather than an act or crime of aggression itself, this finding would still
constitute the determination that an internationally wrongful act had
occurred. There are, therefore, three potential findings that the Court can
91 Conceptualised as a waiver, see Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (n 65) 668.
92 It is possible that even though the alleged aggressor and aggressed States are not considered to
be indispensable third parties during proceedings on the crime of aggression, an issue of due process
may nevertheless arise because the determination of the State conduct element of the crime would
have an effect upon the legal rights and interests of the alleged aggressor State. This exceeds the
present article but is nevertheless worth reflecting on – especially with an eye to future
proceedings. See Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v Ecuador, PCA Case
No 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (27 February 2012) para
4.68–4.70. See also Paparinskis, ‘Revisiting the Indispensable Third Party Principle’ (n 61).
93 2001 ILCArticles (n 3) art 1; Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation
of the Chagos Archipelago fromMauritius in 1965 (AdvisoryOpinion) [2019] ICJ Rep 95, para 177.
94 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 2. 95 See ibid 507–24.
96 See Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ (n 20) 435–53.
97 In the inter-State context, the ICJ has notmade any determination of an act of aggression, even
in the Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo case, regarding the dispute between the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda concerning ‘acts of armed aggression
perpetrated by Uganda on the territory of the DRC’, Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (DRC v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 165. The decision to refrain from finding an
act of aggression was criticised in the separate opinions of Judge Elaraby (paras 9–20) and Judge
Simma (paras 2–3); see also Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission – Partial Award: Jus Ad
Bellum – Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8 (2005) 26 RIAA 457–69.
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make which amount to a determination of internationally wrongful conduct: first,
an act of aggression, which by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the UN Charter; secondly, an act of aggression; thirdly, a
breach of the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter or customary international law. Each finding, regardless of the intensity
of the breach of the international obligation to refrain from an act of aggression
and inter-State force, entails the determination of State responsibility.98
In that light, what, if any, are the legal implications of such a finding? The
answer is provided by the customary law of State responsibility, according to
which the content (remedial substance) of responsibility flows from the
breach of an international obligation.99 New legal relationships therefore
arise upon the commission by a State of an internationally wrongful act.100
The next section will consider the content of State responsibility that arises
from an act of aggression and the manner in which this legal relationship is
operationalised in ICC proceedings.
IV. CONTENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AS
DETERMINED BY THE ICC
Rules on the content of State responsibility101 address the new legal relationship
that arises from the breach of an international obligation. Legal consequences
for the internationally wrongful act of a State, according to Part Two of the 2001
ILC Articles, are, first, obligations to cease wrongful conduct;102 and secondly,
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act.103 This section first focuses on the obligation of the aggressor State to
make full reparation for the injury caused by the act of aggression, and
considers the extent to which the ICC may play a role in the aggressor State
discharging its obligation to make full reparation. As the prohibition of
aggression is generally accepted to have the status of a peremptory norm,104
the section will then turn to the aggravated regime of State responsibility
pursuant to Chapter III of Part Two of the 2001 ILC Articles and the role that
the ICC may play in relation to Articles 40 and 41.
A. Legal Consequences of an Internationally Wrongful Act
The international responsibility of a State is entailed by an internationally
wrongful act and involves legal consequences.105 These include an obligation
98 J Klabbers, ‘Intervention, Armed Intervention, Armed Attack, Threat to Peace, Act of
Aggression, and Threat or Use of Force: What’s the Difference?’ in M Weller (ed), The Oxford
Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015) 505.
99 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) Part Two. 100 ibid Part Two, Commentary 1. 101 ibid.
102 ibid art 30. 103 ibid art 31, see Commentary.
104 ILC Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) on
first reading (n 17) Draft Conclusion 23. 105 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 28.
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to make ‘full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act’,106 where ‘injury includes any damage, whether material or moral,
caused by the internationally wrongful act’.107 Importantly, the general
obligation of reparation stems from the breach of the obligation itself.108 It is
a new obligation, separate from the primary obligation that has been breached.
Thus, in the event of an act of aggression, the aggressor (responsible) State has
an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
wrongful act, regardless of a formal finding by any international court or
tribunal.109 Article 34 of the 2001 ILC Articles provides for several forms of
reparation: ‘(f)ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or
in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter’.110
As the ICC is not a competent forum for inter-State disputes, the Court cannot
order restitution or compensation for an act of aggression. This raises the
question of satisfaction in such a case. Article 37(1) of the 2001 ILC Articles
stipulates:
[t]he State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to
give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good
by restitution or compensation.111
Under the law of State responsibility, satisfaction is one of the forms of
reparation that allows a wrongdoing State to partially discharge its obligation
to make reparation for the injury caused by the wrongful act. Since secondary
rules of State responsibility are expressed without prejudice to institutions, it is
entirely consistent with general rules to provide for particular forms of
reparation to be addressed in a particular context, without prejudice to other
forms of reparation that can be implemented in other judicial or non-judicial
institutions or indeed in the usual informal manner.112 Furthermore,
106 ibid art 31(1), Commentary. 107 ibid art 31(2), Commentary.
108 The Permanent Court of International Justice held ‘[i]t is a principle of international law that
the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form’ inCase
Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A
No 9, 21. See further 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 31, Commentary 4 (‘The general obligation of
reparation is … the immediate corollary of a State’s responsibility, i.e. as an obligation of the
responsible State resulting from the breach, rather than as a right of an injured State or States.’).
109 The ICJ has stated that ‘what constitutes “reparation in an adequate form” clearly varies
depending upon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature and
scope of the injury, since the question has to be examined from the viewpoint of what is the
“reparation in an adequate form” that corresponds to the injury’, Avena and other Mexican
nationals Case (Mexico v US) [2004] ICJ Rep 12, para 119. See further Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Guinea v DRC) (Compensation) [2012] ICJ Rep 324, paras 11–14; Certain Activities Carried
Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Compensation) [2018] ICJ Rep
15, para 30; Jadhav (India v Pakistan) [2019] ICJ Rep 418, para 138.
110 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (n 109) paras 27, 31.
111 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 37(1).
112 ibid art 37, Commentary 1 (‘It is only in those cases where those two forms have not provided
full reparation that satisfaction may be required.’).
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satisfaction is the appropriate remedy only for ‘those injuries, not financially
assessable, which amount to an affront to the State’.113 Forms of ‘non-
material injury’114 would include ‘violations of sovereign and territorial
integrity’.115 As aggression would also comprise non-material injury in
addition to material injury, satisfaction would be an appropriate form of
reparation for non-material injury in relation to an act of aggression.116
The ILC Commentary confirms that ‘the forms of satisfaction listed in the
article are no more than examples.117 Importantly, one example of satisfaction
identified by the ILC in the Commentary to Article 37 is ‘disciplinary or penal
action against the individuals whose conduct caused the internationally
wrongful act’.118 A determination of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8
bis of the Rome Statute by the ICC might lead to potential penal action against
an individual who planned, prepared, initiated or executed the act of aggression
(provided the other elements of the crime pertaining to the individual have been
met).119 In consequence, the prosecution of an individual for the crime of
aggression may be considered a form of satisfaction for the act of aggression.
Another form of satisfaction noted by the ILC is a declaration of the
wrongfulness of the act by a competent court or tribunal.120 This occurs
113 ibid art 37, Commentary 3.
114 For the ubiquity of satisfaction as the remedy ordered and sought in international law, see
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France) (Arbitration Tribunal) (1990) 82 ILR 499, para 122
(‘there is a long established practice of States and international Courts and Tribunals of using
satisfaction as a remedy or form of reparation … for the breach of an international obligation.
This practice relates particularly to the case of moral or legal damage done directly to the State,
especially as opposed to the case of damage to persons involving international responsibilities.’).
115 ibid 271. See also Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ (n 20) 419.
116 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) (Reparations owed by
the Parties) Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the question of reparations
(1 September 2016) paras 7.65–7.66.
117 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 37, Commentary 5 (‘the order of the modalities of satisfaction in
paragraph 2 is not intended to reflect any hierarchy or preference. Paragraph 2 simply gives
examples which are not listed in order of appropriateness or seriousness’ and ‘The forms of
satisfaction listed in the article are no more than examples. The appropriate form of satisfaction
will depend on the circumstances and cannot be prescribed in advance.’).
118 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 37, Commentary 5; see also the first reading, ILC, ‘Draft Articles
on State Responsibility’ in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1996 (United Nations
1996) vol II(2) 58, art 45(2)(d) (‘Satisfaction may take the form of … : in cases where the
internationally wrongful act arose from the serious misconduct of officials or from criminal
conduct of officials or private parties, disciplinary action against, or punishment of, those
responsible’), Commentary 14 (‘This mode of satisfaction is emphasized in literature and has
frequently been requested and granted in diplomatic practice in the form of … the setting up of a
commission of inquiry and the punishment of the responsible individuals’); and J Crawford, ‘Third
Report on State Responsibility’ (15 March, 15 June, 10 and 18 July and 4 August 2000) UN Doc A/
CN.4/507, para 192. In the pendingMyanmar Genocide case, the Gambia has requested the Court to
declare that Myanmar ‘must ensure that persons committing genocide are punished by a competent
tribunal’, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide
(the Gambia v Myanmar) (Order of 23 January 2020) [2020] ICJ Rep 3, para 2.
119 Rome Statute (n 2) art 8 bis(1).
120 2001 ILCArticles (n 3) art 37, Commentary 5 (‘a judicial declaration is not listed in paragraph
2 only because it must emanate from a competent third party with jurisdiction over a dispute, and the
articles are not concerned to specify such party or to deal with issues of judicial jurisdiction’). See
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when an international court or tribunal makes a finding that a State has acted in
breach of an international obligation.121 With regard to a finding of the use of
force, the classic example is the ICJ’s declaration in the Corfu Channel Case
that ‘the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian
sovereignty … and [that the declaration] is in itself appropriate
satisfaction’.122 More recently, the Guyana v Suriname tribunal ruled that
Surinamese naval actions constituted a threat of the use of force, contrary to
international law and found that ‘reparation in the form of satisfaction may
be provided by a judicial declaration that there has been a violation of a
right’ or an obligation.123 By implication, the ICJ took a similar approach in
Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River.124
Can a determination of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis(1) and (or) Article
8 bis(2) of the Rome Statute be considered as a declaration of wrongfulness in
the same manner as a finding of an internationally wrongful act in an inter-State
forum? There is no need for the ICC to describe a finding of an act of aggression
as a declaration of wrongfulness for it to be considered as a form of satisfaction.
Indeed, satisfaction can take many forms, which ‘cannot be prescribed in
advance’.125 Thus, a factual or legal finding of an act of aggression pursuant
to Article 8 bis may amount to a form of satisfaction, irrespective of whether
such a finding by the ICC is couched in the language of a declaration of
wrongfulness. The determination of aggression by the Court is a formal
finding pursuant to Article 8 bis and, as argued above, States have consented
to this.
A determination of an act of aggression by the ICC can be a form of
satisfaction even though the judgment is not res judicata between the injured
also A Tanzi, ‘Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an Internationally Wrongful
Act?’ in M Spinedi and B Simma (eds), United Nations Codification of State Responsibility
(Oceana Publications Inc 1987) 22.
121 Recent examples of when the ICJ found a declaration of wrongfulness as an appropriate form
of reparation in the form of satisfaction include Bosnian Genocide case (n 23) paras 463–4, 469,
471; Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (n 60) paras 203–4; Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, para 269; Certain Activities
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a
Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) [2015] ICJ Rep 665,
para 229. See also Quiborax SA, Non Metallic Minerals SA and Allan Fosk Kaplún v
Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/06/2, Award (16 September 2015) paras
535–6; 550–2; 560–1. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda)
(Reparations owed by the Parties) Counter-memorial of Uganda on Reparation (6 February 2018)
para 10.33. 122 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 35.
123 Guyana v Suriname (Award) (2007) 30 RIAA 1, paras 445 and 485.
124 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua)
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (n 121) paras 96–7.
125 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 37, Commentary 5: Examples of modalities of satisfaction
provided by the ILC include ‘due inquiry into the causes of an accident resulting in harm or
injury, a trust fund to manage compensation payments in the interests of the beneficiaries,
disciplinary or penal action against the individuals whose conduct caused the internationally
wrongful act or the award of symbolic damages for non-pecuniary injury.’
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and responsible State. The law of State responsibility is not prescriptive
regarding the institutional setting within which it is implemented, and it
would go with the grain of this flexibility to treat a determination by the ICC
that there has been an act of aggression by a State Party to the Rome Statute,
or a non-Party referred by the Security Council, as a possible reparation.
Thus, a finding of an act of aggression by the ICC under Article 8 bis(1) may
be considered a form of satisfaction, this being the appropriate (and only)
remedy available to the aggressor State in this forum.126 Moreover, as State
responsibility is not forum specific, other forms of reparation may be sought
in another forum or, indeed, through the diplomatic invocation of
responsibility outside any judicial setting.
As discussed in Section III.C, when determining the State conduct element of
the crime of aggression, the Court may make a finding that there has been a use
of force which falls short of Article 8 bis(2), or an act of aggression pursuant to
Article 8 bis(2) which falls short of the threshold in Article 8 bis(1). Such a
finding would also amount to a finding of an internationally wrongful act by
the ICC and this could also be considered a form of satisfaction. This would
not preclude the injured State from drawing on this finding when seeking
other forms of reparation in different fora.
B. Particular Consequences of a Serious Breach of an Obligation Arising from
a Peremptory Norm of General International Law
It is generally accepted that the prohibition of aggression is a peremptory norm
of international law.127 The definition in Article 8 bis has received attention
from the perspective of the law on the use of force,128 particularly since the
ICC can only consider an act of aggression that satisfies the threshold in
paragraph 1 as amounting to the crime of aggression. There appear to be two
different standards in Article 8 bis with regard to a breach of an obligation
arising from a peremptory norm: a breach (act of aggression) and a more
serious breach (which by its character, gravity, and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the UN Charter). Thus, the threshold in Article 8 bis(1)
accords with the nomenclature of the 2001 ILC Articles concerning ‘a serious
breach of a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law.’129 If both are synchronised, a serious breach of a peremptory
126 See Bosnian Genocide Case (n 23) para 463.
127 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 26, Commentary 5; art 40, Commentary 4; ILC Draft Conclusions
on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) on first reading (n 17) Draft
Conclusion 23; D Tladi, ‘Fourth Report on peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens)’ (n 17) at 27–9. But see F Paddeu, ‘Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons
against Force: Consent as a Defence to the Prohibition of Force’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force
and International Law 227. 128 ILA Report on aggression and the use of force (n 17) 28.
129 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 40. cf D Tladi, ‘Third report on peremptory norms of general
international law (jus cogens)’ (2018) UN Doc A/CN.4/714, Draft Conclusion 21 (refers to a
‘breach’ of a peremptory norm without further qualification); but see ILC Draft Conclusions on
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norm is a necessary condition for individual criminal responsibility for the
crime of aggression at the ICC.
An act of aggression which does not constitute a ‘manifest violation’ of the
UN Charter may, perhaps, still be considered a serious breach of a peremptory
norm.130 But Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute specifically requires a finding
of a breach of this intensity for the purposes of attributing conduct to an
individual for the crime of aggression.131 As Article 40 of the 2001 ILC
Articles does not contain any procedure for determining when a serious
breach has been committed,132 the future practice of the ICC will be
particularly relevant. According to Article 41 of the 2001 ILC Articles, two
particular obligations are placed on States faced with the commission of a
‘serious breach’ of obligations arising from a peremptory norm: first, States
shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach;
secondly, no State shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious
breach, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.133 Notably,
these consequences apply to States other than the State that has committed
the serious breach of a peremptory norm. This regime is known as
aggravated State responsibility.134
The key difference between the general rules of State responsibility and the
regime of aggravated responsibility is that the latter encompasses a multilateral
dimension as the rights and obligations of third States are affected. Thus, if the
ICC determines that there has been an act of aggression (perhaps even one that
falls short of the threshold in Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute), it is also
determining that there has been a serious breach of a peremptory norm and,
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) on first reading (n 17) Draft
Conclusion 19.
130 In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, with respect to the character of the breach, the ICJ
closely paraphrasing Article 41(2) of the 2001 ILC Articles mentioned ‘the breach of a jus
cogens rule’ without further discussion, see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v
Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, para 93. See also 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 41,
Commentary 8 (‘[i]t must also be borne in mind that some of the peremptory norms in question,
most notably the prohibitions of aggression and genocide, by their very nature require an
intentional violation on a large scale.’); Wyler (n 7) 1158, Cassese (n 7) 845–6.
131 The requirement that individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression
specifically requires aggravated State responsibility does not appear to be the intention of the
drafters with respect to the threshold clause in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. Kreß, who
participated in the German delegation, outlines three main considerations underlying the drafters’
inclusion of the threshold clause in Article 8 bis(1): i) for reasons of consistency vis-à-vis the other
crimes under international law in the Rome Statute with respect to the seriousness of the crime; ii) to
exclude grey areas of the law on the use of force, iii) to ensure that the definition of the crime of
aggression in Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute does not exceed existing customary international
criminal law, see Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ (n 20) 507–10. See also D Costelloe, Legal
Consequences of Peremptory Norms in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 190.
132 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 40, Commentary 9. 133 ibid art 41(1) and (2).
134 GAbi-Saab, ‘TheUses of Article 19’ (1999) 10 EJIL 339, 349; AOrakhelashvili,Peremptory
Norms in International Law (OxfordUniversity Press 2008) 242; N Jorgensen, The Responsibility of
States for International Crimes (Oxford University Press 2000) 90; CJ Tams, ‘Do Serious Breaches
Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible State?’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1161, 1161; M
Paparinskis, ‘The Once and Future Law of State Responsibility’ (2020) 114 AJIL 618, 623.
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as such, there are consequences for third States, as set out in Article 41 of the
2001 ILC Articles. Notably, the legal consequences in Article 41 are without
prejudice to the other consequences that arise from the breach of the
international obligation,135 and further consequences which are entailed by a
serious breach of a peremptory norm.136 In other words, the responsible State
is still under an obligation to cease wrongful conduct and make full reparation
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,137 and international
law may provide further consequences for the serious breach of the
peremptory norm.138 As the ILC Commentary to the 2001 ILC Articles puts it:
international law may recognize additional legal consequences flowing from the
commission of a serious breach in the sense of article 40. The fact that such further
consequences are not expressly referred to… does not prejudice their recognition
in present-day international law, or their further development.… the legal regime
of serious breaches is itself in a state of development. By setting out certain basic
legal consequences of serious breaches in the sense of article 40, article 41 does
not intend to preclude the future development of a more elaborate regime of
consequences entailed by such breaches.139
With regard to aggression, additional legal consequences do indeed flow from
the commission of a serious breach in the sense of Article 40. Although
individual criminal responsibility for aggression exists under customary
international law,140 and these legal consequences also apply outside the ICC
regime; the regime at the ICC for the crime of aggression gives rise to an
institutionalised ‘elaborate regime’ of consequences entailed by a serious
breach of a peremptory norm in the sense of Article 40. As the only
international forum that can prosecute the crime of aggression, the Rome
Statute provides an institutional setting for the determination of a serious
breach of a peremptory norm,141 upon the finding of which, particular
consequences, ie individual criminal responsibility, are entailed.142
135 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 41(3); and as confirmed in the ILC Draft Conclusions on
Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) on first reading (n 17) Draft
Conclusion 19(4). 136 ibid. 137 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) arts 30 and 31.
138 In the case of aggression, the ILC Commentary points to the example of the Security Council
as having a specific role under the UN Charter, 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 40, Commentary 9.
139 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 41, Commentary 14.
140 Art 6(a) Charter of the International Military Tribunal (crimes against peace); UNGA Res 95
(1) 1946 (Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal); see also M Wong, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of
Jus Ad Bellum under Customary International Law’ in M Bergsmo et al. (eds), Historical
Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 3 (Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher 2015); C
McDougall, ‘The Crimes against Peace Precedent’ in C Kreß and S Barriga (eds), The Crime of
Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press 2016) vol I; Kreß, ‘The State Conduct
Element’ (n 20) 510. 141 Rome Statute (n 2) art 8 bis(1).
142 cf Tams, ‘Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible
State?’ (n 135) 1173–8.
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V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN ACT OF AGGRESSION
AND THE ICC
State responsibility, and the content of responsibility arise independently of
invocation by another State.143 The injured State is not the only State with a
legal interest in the invocation of State responsibility for aggression. The
primary obligation under international law concerning the prohibition of
aggression is of an erga omnes character,144 which means that the obligation
is also owed to the international community as a whole.145 Thus, every State
has a legal interest in compliance with the obligation prohibiting
aggression,146 and may invoke the responsibility of an alleged aggressor
State,147 even if they individually have not been injured by the breach.148
As discussed in Section IV, the findings of the ICCmay amount to reparation
in the form of satisfaction. This section will consider the avenues available at the
ICC for States Parties entitled to invoke the responsibility of an aggressor State
(Party). Could States Parties entitled to invoke the responsibility of an aggressor
State rely on the available trigger mechanisms to initiate proceedings? This
section will first consider the invocation of responsibility by the victim State
of the alleged aggressor State, and then consider the invocation of
responsibility based on the erga omnes nature of the primary obligation.
A. The Invocation of Responsibility by an Injured State Party
Part Three of the 2001 ILC Articles provides the general framework for the
implementation of State responsibility. The most obvious actor to consider
for invocation of responsibility is the injured State.149 Article 42 of the 2001
ILC Articles stipulates that an injured State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to that
State.150 An injured State that is party to the Rome Statute may refer a
situation to the Prosecutor under Article 15 bis of the Rome Statute to initiate
an investigation of the crime of aggression, and so this is one of the avenues
available to an injured State that is a party to the Rome Statute to invoke the
responsibility of the aggressor State (Party). A State referral by the injured
143 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) Part Three, Commentary.
144 The ICJ named the outlawing of aggression as an example of an obligation erga omnes in
Barcelona Traction (n 18) para 34. See also Tanzi (n 120) 31; J Crawford, ‘Responsibility for
Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An Appraisal of Article 48 of the ILC Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ in U Fastenrath et al. (eds), From
Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press
2011) 228–39. 145 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 33. 146 ibid arts 42(b) and 48.
147 I Scobbie, ‘The Invocation of Responsibility for the Breach of “Obligations under Peremptory
Norms of General International Law”’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1201, 1207–8; Crawford, ‘Responsibility for
Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An Appraisal of Article 48 of the ILC Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (n 144) 228–39.
148 In the pendingMyanmar Genocide case (n 118) para 41; Sicilianos (n 19) 1139–40; Scobbie
(n 147) 1213–15. 149 Sicilianos (n 19) 1139. 150 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 41.
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State (Party) under Article 15 bis can be understood as a form of invocation of
responsibility for an act of aggression or, at the very least, a lex specialis
mechanism that is functionally analogous to and builds upon the customary
rule. It is worth recalling that, as a general matter, the law of State
responsibility is open to the possibility of lex specialis mechanisms that
partially modify customary rules and adapt them to particular institutional
settings, including by third-party decision-makers, as has been done by the
World Trade Organization with regard to countermeasures.151 The procedural
mechanisms of the ICC may be seen as consonant with this institutional
practice.
The 2001 ILCArticles do not say how notice should be given, or the forms of
invocation, and there appears to be great flexibility in this regard.152 In addition,
States may choose between the various forms of reparation.153 This may be of
relevance when the State wishing to refer a situation to the Prosecutor pursuant
to Article 15 bis takes into account the requirement to provide notice to the
alleged aggressor State of which the perpetrator is a national.
B. The Invocation of Responsibility by States other than an Injured State and
International Organisations
States other than an injured State, as members of the international community,
have a legal interest in the compliance with an obligation erga omnes.154 Article
48(1) of the 2001 ILC Articles stipulates that a State other than an injured State
is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation breached
is owed to the international community as a whole. The important caveat is that,
under Article 48, a claim for the performance of the obligation of reparation can
only be invoked in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the
obligation breached.155As shown in Section IV A, in the context of aggression,
the proceedings before the ICC can result in penal sanctions against an
151 ibid Part Three, Ch II, Commentary 9, and art 50, Commentary 10.
152 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 43, Commentary 4; relevant examples include Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) invoking the responsibility of Uganda for acts of aggression
perpetrated by Uganda on the territory of the DRC, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(n 98) paras 175–9. See also the Application Instituting Proceedings filed in the Registry of the
Court on 23 June 1999, and Ethiopia invoking the responsibility of Eritrea for loss, damage and
injury suffered by the Claimant, including loss, damage and injury suffered by its nationals, as a
result of the alleged use of force against the Claimant in violation of the rules of international law
on resorting to the use of force, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission – Partial Award (n 97)
457–69.
153 In the Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race
and to Nuclear Disarmament case, the Court was sceptical about an overly formalistic reading of the
notice requirement and its application in judicial settings, Obligations concerning Negotiations
relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands
v UK) (Preliminary Objections) [2016] ICJ Rep 833, para 45. See 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 43.
Commentary 4. 154 Chagos (n 93) para 180; Barcelona Traction (n 18) para 33.
155 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 48(2).
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individual and determination that there has been an act of aggression pursuant to
Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute. Understanding satisfaction as an extraordinary
reparation available at the ICC for aggression accords with Article 48 of the ILC
Articles.156
Thus, a State other than the injured State, and which is a party to the Rome
Statute, may refer a situation pursuant to Article 15 bis of the Rome Statute.
Additionally, a State other than an injured State, which is not a party to the
Rome Statute, may submit a communication to the OTP in view of the
exercise of proprio motu powers pursuant to Article 15 bis. Thus, Article 15
bis of the Rome Statute seems analogous to Article 48 of the 2001 ILC
Articles, in that a State other than an injured State may refer a situation to the
Prosecutor with regard to the crime of aggression, arising from an act of
aggression by a State Party, or submit a communication regarding a situation
to the OTP in light of proprio motu powers. Notably, the rules pertaining to
the notice of a claim pursuant to Article 48 are the same as those for Article
42 as examined above.157
Article 15 ter of the Rome Statute provides for the UN Security Council to
make a referral, acting as a trigger mechanism for the initiation of an
investigation concerning a crime of aggression158, as does Article 15 bis
which permits the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation proprio motu. In
such cases, it is the OTP and Security Council159, as organs of International
Organisations, which act in furthering the interests of the international
community. The ICC and Security Council are, of course, not States for the
purposes of invocation of responsibility under Article 48 of the 2001 ILC
Articles. Articles 15 bis and 15 ter of the Rome Statute could be seen as
providing an institutionalised response to a serious breach of a peremptory
norm for the purposes of Article 40 of the 2001 ILC Articles,160 that is,
enabling the OTP (ICC) and the Security Council (UN) to trigger the process
for the invocation of international responsibility for aggression (of the State
and individual).
Although the ICC is not a part of the UN institutional framework as such,161
the Rome Statute does expressly allow the Security Council to trigger the
initiation of an investigation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.162 There
is clearly a relationship between the ICC and the UN,163 particularly in the
case of (the crime of) aggression,164 and in which, the Security Council has a
156 CJ Tams, ‘Individual States as Guardians of Community Interests’ in U Fastenrath et al. (eds),
From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford University
Press 2011).
157 A Gattini, ‘A Return Ticket to “Communitarisme”, Please’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1181, 1196.
158 See Klein (n 7) 1243–7.
159 Tanzi (n 120) 32; Cassese (n 7) 846; Klein (n 7) 1248–50. 160 Klein (n 7) 1250–5.
161 For a study on the implementation of State responsibility by UN Organs, see V-J Proulx,
Institutionalizing State Responsibility: Global Security and UN Organs (Oxford University Press
2016). 162 Rome Statute (n 2) art 13(b). 163 ibid art 2.
164 ibid former art 5(2). See also Blokker (n 49).
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specific role.165 This seems to reflect Article 41(3) of the 2001 ILC Articles, as
being ‘further consequences’ that a ‘serious’ breach (for the purposes of Article
40) may entail under international law.166
C. Further Implications
What further implications may arise on the inter-State level from the Court’s
finding of an act of aggression? The question of whether such a finding has
the force of res judicata is beyond the scope of this article, but three tentative
points will be made.
First, even if the determination is not treated as technically binding in another
(inter-State) forum, the finding by the Court that an act of aggression has
occurred carries great weight as a subsidiary means for determining rules of
international law.167 In the field of international courts and tribunals, one
analogy may be provided by advisory opinions of the ICJ, not binding as
such but capable of authoritatively explaining the content of binding rules,
including on issues of State responsibility.168 Moreover, international legal
process uses advisory opinions as one important step for authoritatively
determining legal position, which the political organ of international
organisations can take as the starting point for further action, again in line
with the desirable effects of ICC work on aggression.169
Secondly, a determination of an act of aggression pursuant to Article 8 bis is a
legal finding by the Court that there has been an internationally wrongful act. It
is important as a formal identification by an international court of a breach of
international law, weighing and evaluating legal and factual claims in a
judicial forum. Recall, however, that legal consequences under law of State
165 2001 ILC Articles (n 3) art 40, Commentary 9, and art 41, Commentary 14; see also Cassese
(n 7) 846. 166 ibid art 41(3).
167 Art 38(1)(d) Statute of the International Court of Justice.
168 For example, Chagos (n 93) paras 177–82. Legal findings by international criminal tribunals
on issues of international law, including responsibility, have been given considerable weight by the
International Court of Justice,BosnianGenocide (n 23) paras 190, 195, 198–201, 292, 296, 300; The
treatment of an ICJ advisory opinion in the recent judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea inMauritius/Maldives is one example of the importance that international law attributes to
judicial determinations of State responsibility, whether or not they are binding on the States
concerned, Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Mauritius and
Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives) (Preliminary Objections of the Republic of
Maldives, 18 December 2019) ITLOS Reports 2021, paras 140–251.
169 UNGA Res 71/292, ‘Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on
the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965’ (22
June 2017) UN Doc A/RES/71/292; UNGA Res 73/295, ‘Advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from
Mauritius in 1965’ (22 May 2019) UN Doc A/RES/73/295; UNGA Special Political and
Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), Summary record of the 7th meeting (9
December 2019) UN Doc A/C.4/74/SR.7; see also UN Press release, ‘Delegates call upon United
Kingdom to Comply with Ruling by International Court of Justice that Chagos Archipelago’s
decolonization was never lawfully completed’ (UN.org, 15 October 2019) <https://www.un.org/
press/en/2019/gaspd696.doc.htm>.
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responsibility do not stem from invocation or determination but from the
breach. It is the breach that creates a new legal relationship whereby the
wrongdoing (aggressor) State has an obligation to cease wrongful conduct
and make full reparation for the injury caused by aggression to the extent that
it has not been achieved by satisfaction, including by restitution and
compensation.
Thirdly, whilst it may be objected that the ICC cannot provide a forum in
which full reparation for the injury caused by the aggression can be awarded,
the decentralised system of international law means that it is not unusual for
there to be no formal settings in which the responsibility of a State may be
invoked by another State under Article 42 or 48 of the 2001 ILC Articles.
The content of State responsibility still applies, even in the absence of a
forum: ‘in the (still) sparsely judicialised international law, State
responsibility is conceptually autonomous of particular (or indeed any)
judicial institutions for implementation’.170 One may be dispirited by the
seeming insignificance of a finding that a State is responsible for an act of
aggression in a judicial forum unable to award full reparations. However, this
is the reality of legal process in the international legal system. When considered
from that perspective, the specialised institutional regime at the ICC represents a
significant development in international law, as the Court provides a formal
judicial setting which has the competence, at least partially, to identify the
responsibility of States for acts of aggression.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Aggression at the ICC has been extensively considered from the perspective of
international criminal law and procedure. This article has sought to do so from
the perspective of the law of State responsibility, connecting the threads
between an important specialised field of international law and its
foundational elements. The content of State responsibility arises from the
internationally wrongful act of aggression, independently of any invocation
by a State entitled to do so under Articles 42 and 48 of the 2001 ILC
Articles. That said, the ICC provides an institutional setting in which such
States may trigger a process through which international responsibility (of the
State and individual) for aggression may be determined. Although legal
consequences arise independently of invocation and determination of
responsibility, the Court’s judicial finding may serve as a form of
satisfaction, amounting to a form of reparation for the act of aggression under
the law of State responsibility.
The law of State responsibility also recognises an aggravated regime, arising
from a serious breach of a jus cogens obligation. Aggression for the purposes of
170 M Paparinskis, ‘A Case Against Crippling Compensation in International Law of State
Responsibility’ (2020) 83 MLR 1246, 1251.
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the crime of aggression in Article 8 bis(1) of the Rome Statute clearly comprises
a serious breach of a peremptory norm as its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter. The ICC provides an
institutionalised setting competent to determine whether such a serious
breach of a peremptory norm has occurred. This is a significant development
in international law, and has implications both for situating the ICC within
the broader international legal order and for reflecting on the role of
international organisations with regard to aggravated responsibility.
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